The Quick Response (QR) program is a hierarchical suite of information technologies and applications designed to improve the performance of retailers.
The Performance Impacts Of Quick Response And Strategic Alignment

In Specialty Retailing Introduction
Today, the word retailing evokes selling on the web. With all the excitement about shopping on the Internet, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the majority of electronic commerce is, and likely will remain, business-to-bus iness transactions (Emerging Digital Economy, 1998) . The sheer volume of electronically mediated business buying and selling makes it important to assess the impacts of information technology on the performance of retailing organizations.
Like other service industries, retailing is a relative newcomer to the use of IT (National Research Council, 1994) . On the other hand, the labor-intensive nature of the industry creates favorable opportunities for IT use. The retailing industry is actively seeking new ways to use IT effectively in support of distribution, inventory management, planning, and sales functions. A package of information technologies called "Quick Response" has been claimed by consultants and practitioners to have enormous potential for improving organizational performance in retailing (Retail Information Systems News, 1993 , 1995 .
The obvious question is: has the adoption of Quick Response improved the business performance of retailing firms? But past research has shown how difficult it is to pin down the links between information technology and organizational performance. While many people believe that IT has a strong effect on business success, empirical support remains mixed (Barua and Lee, 1997 , Boynton, Victor and Pine, 1993 , Brynjolfsson, 1993 , Clemons and Row, 1989 , Crowston and Treacy, 1986 , Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1994 , Harris and Katz, 1989 , Markus and Soh, 1993 , Quinn, 1994 , Sethi et al, 1993 , Weill, 1992 .
Many factors contribute to the difficulty of finding strong associations between IT use and firm performance. One is the practical definition of "IT use." What precisely constitutes use? Can an organization truly be said to be "using" an integrated enterprise resource planning package if it only employs the financial modules, for example? How much of the enterprise package does the organization need to adopt before it can be said to benefit from integration? And does the organization get more benefit from adopting more modules?
Definitional questions such as these are particularly evident with Quick Response technology in the retailing industry. As described by consultants and practitioners, the Quick Response "program" consists of four levels of successively more sophisticated technologies and applications (Retail Information Systems News, 1993 , 1995 . Level 1 includes point-of-sale technology and price lookup. Level 2 includes automatic inventory replenishment and sales and inventory forecasting. Level 3 includes pre-and post-season planning and support for cross-docking. Level 4 involves seasonless retailing and the transfer of inventory management functions to suppliers. The higher level technologies are generally believed to provide more benefits, but retailers are expected to start with the lower level technologies. Thus, Quick Response technology allows us to explore different definitions of IT adoption and use.
A second factor contributing to the difficulty of finding strong associations between IT use and firm performance is theoretical. Many theories of IT impact assume that impacts are contingent upon, or moderated by, various organizational and environmental conditions. One of the most frequently postulated contingencies is the degree of fit or alignment between the specific IT adopted and the business strategy of the firm (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993; Lentz and Henderson, 1998 , Luftman, 1995 , Luftman, Lewis and Oldach, 1993 , Venkatraman, 1989 . This theory holds that firms using IT in ways consistent with their business strategies will achieve the best performance results.
Again, the Quick Response program in retailing affords a useful opportunity to examine the strategic fit hypothesis. Some of the technologies and applications in the program would support a strategy of supplier partnering or of "customer intimacy," whereas others are most heavily geared toward a strategy of transaction efficiency.
In this paper, we report findings about the relationship between QR technology and organizational performance from a cross-sectional survey of specialty retailers. We found an association between adoption of QR (at a minimal level )and firm performance and a high level of alignment between the IT adopted and strategic goals. However, there was no support for the hypothesis that higher levels of QR use lead to higher bus iness performance, or that poor IT fit with strategy leads to poorer performance. These results have interesting implications for our theories of the links between IT and firm performance.
Theoretical Background
Well-managed organizations generally try to improve their performance when they invest in IT. Yet, the evidence on how well they succeed is mixed (Boynton, Victor and Pine, 1993 , Brynjolfsson, 1993 , Clemons and Row, 1989 , Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1994 , Harris and Katz, 1989 , Markus and Soh, 1993 , National Research Council, 1994 , Quinn, 1994 , Sethi et al, 1993 , Weill, 1992 . This apparent "productivity paradox" has produced differing reactions from practitioners and academics.
Consultants and other practitioners often make relatively unqua lified claims about the relationship between IT use and business benefits. In specialty retailing, the benefits of the Quick Response (QR) are believed to be so great that all firms in the industry will benefit from adopting them (Retail Information Systems News, 1993 , 1995 , 1997 , Eure, 1991 , Juneau, 1992 , Chain Store Age Executive, 1992 , Pastore, 1994 . Further, QR proponents claim that greater benefits flow from the more advanced technologies in the program, which are in turn believed to require prior investment in the basic QR technologies. Therefore, QR practitioners implicitly hypothesize that, regardless of factors like unique business strategies, specialty retailers who adopt more of the QR program will perform better than those who adopt less.
By contrast, academics have directly addressed the ambiguous empirical relationship between IT and firm performance by refining their theoretical models. They have specified various contingencies believed to moderate IT impacts. In particular, they have urged organizations to align technologies and applications with unique business strategies (Cash et al, 1992 , Chan, Huff and Copeland, 1997 , Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993a and 1993b , King, 1978 , Luftman, 1997 , McFarlan, 1984 , Parsons, 1983 , Tavakolian, 1989 , Venkatraman, 1989 . This theory explicitly assumes that different firms in the same industry segment will have different business strategies, requiring different combinations of IT for strategic alignment and good business performance. Thus, business strategy should determine whether a specialty retailer will achieve superior business performance by investing 1) only in basic technologies from the Quick Response program, 2) in both basic and advanced technologies or 3) only in advanced technologies.
Each of these perspectives has the ability to shed light on our understanding of IT impact on firm performance since they address different issues. The practitioners focus on the extensiveness of IT use, whereas the academics emphasize issues of business strategy that may be unique to a specific firm. Below, each perspective is examined in greater detail for hypotheses about the impact of QR technologies on retailers' performance.
The QR Program in the Specialty Retailing Industry
Specialty retailers are firms adopting a focused approach to retailing (Standard and Poors, 1993) . The "focus" may lie in product offerings, product delivery or customer service. Specialty retailers occupy a unique position in "the retail pyramid." (See Figure  1. ) They range in size and scope from small local chains of 5 stores in a single state to international giants with nearly 2,000 stores spread across the United States and beyond (Peterson, 1992) . The product lines of specialty retailers are as diverse as health foods, apparel, food, auto supplies, housewares, music and video, books, computer software and supplies, and bed and bath linens (Standard and Poors, 1993, Peterson, 1992) .
Insert Figure 1 about here
Typically more focused, agile and flexible than the major national department stores and yet more able to enjoy economies of scale than small "mom and pop" retail stores, specialty retailers are the most profitable retail segment. They are well positioned to use IT to level the playing field against major national department store chains (Peterson, 1992 , Cassidy, 1994 , Lynch, 1992 , while maintaining the strong local focus characteristic of mom-and-pop stores. The specialty retailing industry is an especially interesting one to study today, because, even though technology has moved rapidly since the time this study was conducted (1994), the industry has been slow to move forward on the adoption of new technologies. The technologies addressed in this study continue to be essentially the same ones utilized today, although today they are often accessed via the Internet.
According to trade literature and consulting firms, the QR program has a strong positive impact on specialty retailer performance (Retail Information Systems News, 1993 , 1995 , 1997 , Chain Store Age Executive, 1991 , Executive Briefing, 1992 . Potential improvements from adopting QR include "higher inventory turns, fewer markdowns, better in-stock position and higher profitability" (Retail Information Systems News, 1993) . The QR program is the retailing industry's equivalent of "just-in-time" manufacturing (Executive Briefing, 1992 , Juneau, 1992 . Similar concepts have been utilized in other sales environments. Effective Channel Response in grocery stores (Clark, 1994) and Effective Customer Response (Fisher at al, 1994) applied to specific retailers are targeted at better defining inventory levels and working more closely with suppliers. The implementation of QR is seen as supporting multiple organizational strategies, but "[n]o matter which strategy a company chooses, it needs to excel in major elements of QR to implement that strategy successfully" (Retail Information Systems News, 1995, p 8) .
QR is positioned as "an array of technology options for supporting the company's mission" (Retail Information Systems News, 1996, p. 7) . This array is often visualized as a hierarchical suite of tools, with each level building on those below it. In an early 1990's study, Kurt Salmon & Associates (Retail Information Systems News, 1993) identified four levels of QR based on a mix of technologies and applications employed by retailers. (See Table 1 .) The first level involves automated point-of-sale (POS), bar coding, universal product codes (UPC), automatic price look-up and electronic data interchange (EDI) for order entry and inventory management. This level mainly consists of technologies that form the infrastructure for many of the supply chain management (SCM) applications in higher levels. A second level involves automatic replenishment by suppliers, forecasting and electronic invoicing. EDI at this level includes order status, invoicing and advance shipment notices. Enhancements in level three include using the information gleaned through the earlier levels for pre-and post-season planning, and shipment container marking and arrangement. In the fourth level, suppliers actually take over inventory management functions (an activity that is today called vendor-managed inventory). This level also includes seasonless retailing (the ability to provide all products on a year-round basis) and space management.
Insert Table 1 about here
Progression through the QR hierarchy implies a transition from a simple focus on transaction efficiencies to an awareness of strategic opportunities from partnering with customers and suppliers. According to CSC partner Marie Beninati, "Retailers recognize the strategic value of technology in positioning themselves for success…in the past retailers saw I/T simply as a tool for high-speed processing of massive amounts of small transactions. Today, they recognize that information technology is a prerequisite for survival." (Competing with Key Technologies, 1995, p. 8) QR technologies create a type of interorganizational system (IOS) involving the retailer, manufacturers, transporters, downstream suppliers, and banks (Executive Briefing, 1992 , Chain Store Age Executive, 1991 , Retail Information Systems News, 1993 , 1995 . These technologies play an important role in supply chain management. The decision to collaborate or compete in connections with customers, suppliers and (increasingly) with competitors is generally viewed as a strategic decision (Scott Morton, 1991) . Electronic markets made possible through EDI can be a source of competitive advantage (Bakos, 1987 , Barua and Lee, 1997 , Malone, Yates and Benjamin, 1987 . Much research suggests a positive impact of EDI on firm performance (Benjamin, de Long, and Scott Morton, 1990 , Bouchard, 1992 , Clemons and McFarlan, 1986 , Hammer and Mangorian, 1987 , Holland and Blackman, 1992 , Mukhopadhyay, Kekre, and Kalathur, 1996 , O'Connor, 1991 , Rochester, 1989 .
These arguments suggest that information technology may be a major factor in improving firm performance by altering competitive dynamics in the retail supply chain. Given the strategic and interorganizational nature of the QR program, there is reason to credit practitioners' claims of a tight link between QR and specialty retailer performance. Overall, the practitioner perspective suggests the following hypothesis:
H1. Specialty retailers that adopt QR will outperform those that do not adopt QR.
The QR program is usually described as a hierarchy of technologies and applications ranging from more basic to more advanced. Each of the identified levels can have a differential impact on the adopting organization. This suggests:
H1a. Higher levels of QR adoption will maker greater contributions to performance than lower levels.
It is generally assumed that retailers will acquire more basic QR technologies before moving to more advanced ones (Retail Information Systems News, 1993 , 1995 , Chain Store Age Executive, 1991 , possibly because of technological dependencies. This assumption may, however, be incorrect. Thus, it is useful to inquire whether cumulative adoption of the technologies in the QR hierarchy enhances specialty retailers' performance. This suggests:
H1b. Higher cumulative levels of QR adoption will make greater contributions to performance than lower levels.
The Strategic Alignment Perspective and Specialty Retailing
It has become almost axiomatic that a firm should align its IT strategy with its corporate strategy to achieve greatest effectiveness. "Indeed, the key strategic IT management challenge lies in the identification of those strategic dimensions that require modification under different contingencies for enhancing organizational performance" (Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993a) .
The strategic alignment perspective suggests that the effect of IT on performance will depend on the fit between information technology strategy and corporate strategy. This perspective has a long pedigree in diverse literatures. These include strategic management (Andrews, 1980 , Ansoff, 1988 , Chandler, 1962 , Buzzell and Gale, 1987 , Hamel and Prahalad, 1990 , Mintzberg, 1979 , Quinn, 1980 , Wrapp, 1967 , Porter, 1980 , 1985 , Selznick, 1957 , Wiseman, 1988 , structural contingencies (Pfeffer, 1982 , Scott, 1981 , Thompson, 1967 , Galbraith, 1973 , Schoonhoven, 1981 , Gutek, 1989 , and strategic fit (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985, Venkatraman, 1989) .
A number of researchers have studied the alignment between organizational and IT variables as a predictor of effective IT use. There are a number of terms for alignment, including strategic alignment (Broadbent and Weill, 1993 , Chan, Huff and Copeland, 1997 , Henderson and Venkatraman, 1992 , 1993 , Luftman, Lewis and Oldach, 1993 , linkage (Reich and Benbasat, 1996) and harmony (Luftman, 1997) . Among the alignments studied are the fit between: IS structure and organizational infrastructure (EinDor and Segev, 1982, Olson, 1978) , organizational and IT strategy (McFarlan and McKenney, 1983) , competitive strategy and IT structure (Tavakolian, 1989) , business strategy, IS strategy and strategic orientation (Chan et al, 1997) , competitive strategy and strategic IT planning (King, 1978) , and strategy and infrastructure Luftman, 1995, Luftman, 1997) . The researchers in these traditions attribute variation in IT structures to differences in organizational context variables. They argue that IT systems should conform with context variables such as organizational decision-making structure, managerial philosophy, organizational form, and organizational competitive strategy (Cash et al, 1992, McFarlan and McKenney, 1983 ). Henderson and Venkatraman (1993a) suggest that companies can be successful in aligning their IT and business strategies in several ways. Their Strategic Alignment Model brings strategy and IT together by balancing internal and external factors and business and IT domains. The four elements of the model are business strategy, IT strategy, organizational infrastructure and processes, and IT infrastructure and processes. The authors suggest that alignment may begin in any of the four domains and proceed to others with equally effective results.
In earlier work, Venkatraman (1990) had focused particularly on the "coalignment between the strategic context and the IT infrastructure of a business" as a driver of successful exploitation of IT (p. 151). The current research maintains Venkatraman's earlier focus on the strategic coalignment of business strategy and IT, minimizing the importance of organizational infrastructures and processes. The reason is that, while the firms studied populated the same industry segment and shared similar organizational infrastructures and processes, they adopted different strategic approaches to the marketplace (Peterson, 1992) . Thus, strategy is more likely than infrastructure and processes to account for any observed variation in IT adopted.
For the purposes of this paper, strategic alignment is defined as the correlation between the business strategy of a firm and the firm's IT strategy. In particular, we use Venkatraman's (1989) definition of alignment (or 'fit') as moderation, because we are concerned with the effect of the two coaligned variables on a third (performance). The basic research model for strategic alignment is presented in Figure 2 .
Insert Figure 2 about here
Alignment is operationalized in this study using strategy descriptors appropriate to the specialty retailing context, derived from Holland, Lockett and Blackman (1992) and Treacy and Wiersema (1993) . Holland, Lockett and Blackman's (1992) model emphasizes the three basic elements of the "retail pipeline:" supplier, retailer's internal operations, and customer. Another model (Treacy and Wiersema, 1993) identifies three essential customer-oriented "value disciplines" as defining a firm's strategy: operational excellence, customer intimacy, and product leadership. The Treacy and Wiersema typology is particularly appropriate for the specialty retailing area, because of its strong focus on customer-oriented issues. Consistent with the strategic alignment perspective, Treacy and Wiersema (1993 and various public presentations) also explain that different technolo gies, applications, and infrastructures are required to support each of their three different strategies.
Our study categorizes the business and IT strategies of specialty retailers using concepts derived from the Holland, Lockett and Blackman and the Treacy and Wiersema models. (See Table 2 . The descriptions used in Table 2 are the precise terms used in the survey instrument.) Specialty retailers can adopt a strategic focus on supplier relationships, internal activities, or on the customer. They can likewise choose to focus their IT efforts on transaction efficiency, supplier partnering, or customer detail.
Insert Table 2 about here
According to the strategic alignment perspective, business strategies and IT strategies must be matched for optimal firm performance. Table 3 presents the conditions of match, hypothesized as yielding high performance, and mismatch, hypothesized as yielding lower performance.
Insert Table 3 about here
In strong form, the strategic alignment variant of contingency theory posits a link between strategic match and firm performance (MacDonald, 1991 , Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985 , Venkatraman, 1989 . This suggests the following hypothesis.
H2. Specialty retailers with a match between their corporate (pipeline) strategy and their IT strategy will outperform those with a mismatch.
Many contingency theorists are satisfied with less stringent empirical support for their thesis than the match-performance link. Evidence that firms have achieved strategic alignment is often viewed as support for contingency theory, even if no performance link can be shown, since many other factors than match can affect firm performance. In the event that no link is found between match and performance, it becomes very important to know whether few firms have sought strategic alignment (suggesting that they do not see this factor as important or that match is difficult to achieve) or whether many firms have sought strategic alignment (suggesting that they take the importance of match for granted, but that it no longer differentiates high and low performance). The foregoing discussion suggests:
H2a. Specialty retailers will adopt an IT strategy consistent with their corporate (pipeline) strategy (e.g., they will exhibit "match" in the alignment matrix).
The strategic alignment perspective is logically and intuitively appealing to academicians, particularly those schooled in general management, strategy, and organizational behavior. The basic premise of strategic alignment is that technology yields benefits when the technology has been carefully selected to fit the firm's goals. Thus, the strategic alignment model presents a different perspective on QR technology in specialty retailing than the statements of QR practitioners. Together, they may provide a more complete picture of QR's performance impacts than either perspective alone.
Methodology
This section describes our strategy for testing hypotheses derived from practitioner and academic perspectives on the performance impacts of QR technologies. We first describe the research design. Then we discuss measurement of firm performance and the key independent variables.
Research Design
The study involves analysis of data from a cross-sectional survey of firms in the specialty retailing industry. Access to firms in the industry was obtained through RETEX (Retail Technology Consortium), a consortium of specialty retailing firms whose mission is to address common technology problems and opportunities. RETEX members are diverse, including firms with regional, natio nal, and international focus, firms engaged in a variety of different product lines (fashion, health, food, specialty items, entertainment products), and firms with differing approaches to the use of IT.
Preliminary case studies of eight members of RETEX's board of directors were conducted. The case sites included high and low performers and high and low users of Quick Response technologies. (See Table 4 .) Conducting the case studies involved headquarters and store visits andmeetings with operating personnel, executive teams and key Information Systems executives. The results of the cases were important in three respects. First, the cases showed that it was appropriate to operationalize corporate and IT strategies using the model outlined in Table 2 . Second, the cases gave face validity to the four level QR model of Kurt Salmon and Associates (Retail Information Systems News, 1993) . Third, the information provided by the key IS executives was consistent with insights gained from other members of management, suggesting that it would be appropriate to use a single respondent in our larger-sample survey.
Insert Table 4 about here Data about performance, strategy, technology and other organizational and IT dimensions were gathered through a self-administered, self-report questionnaire, completed by the top IT professional in each firm. Since the research explored the intersection of IT and corporate strategy, the top IT professional was well positioned to respond to the questions. In addition, many of the objective measures reported on the questionnaires were verified against an industry database maintained by RETEX. The database covered company demographics, IT use measures, and company-specific information on each of the organizational performance measures we used (described more fully below). The database provided a cross-check on the reliability of the selfreport data and allowed us to determine that the sample was indeed quite representative of the industry (as discussed below). The questionnaire was mailed to 200 RETEX members. Twenty-five members declined to participate. Eighty usable responses were received, yielding a 40% response rate. This response rate is quite high for mailed surveys, a fact we attribute to RETEX's sponsorship of the study.
The Performance Construct
The concept of performance underlies much research in strategic management and information science. Definitions of performance vary widely. Definitions include meeting specific goals, maintaining specific operating ratios, achieving profitability targets, and maintaining long term viability as an enterprise. The prevailing work in IT has concentrated on the use of industry-specific, short-term quantitative measures of performance, such as annual sales growth. Table 5 outlines the diversity of performance measures used in recent research on IT and performance (Baets, 1996 , Bender, 1986 , Broadbent and Weill, 1996 , Cron and Sobol, 1983 , Floyd and Woolridge, 1990 , Harris and Katz, 1989 , Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1994 , Markus and Soh, 1993 , Reich and Benbasat, 1996 , Sethi, Hwang and Pegels, 1993 , Strassman, 1990 , Turner, 1985 , Weill, 1992 .
Insert Table 5 about here
The performance measures used in the current study include key operating ratios used in the specialty retailing industry, including profitability, comparable store sales growth, sales per employee, sales per square foot, and stock turns. Experienced industry analysts actually use these measures in examining the retail industry (Standard and Poor's Register, 1993) . Together, our multiple measures capture several aspects of performance. "Profitability" is a standard measure of net income divided by sales. "Comparable store sales growth" measures the sales growth for stores that have been in operation for more than 12 months. This measure avoids overemphasizing the results of new store openings and is similar to a measure used by Cron and Sobol (1983) , Sethi et al (1993) and Weill (1992) . "Sales per employee" measures the effectiveness of sales staff, however it may be influenced by the pricing of the merchandise. "Sales per square foot" measures the sales intensity of the specific stores. "Stock turns" measures the number of times inventory is sold over the course of a year, a key measure of how rapidly products are moving through the store. The sales per square foot and stock turns measures are specific to the specialty retailing industry; Katz (1989, 1991) used industry-specific measures in their study of insurance firms. The survey was conducted in the spring of 1994 and respondents reported each of these measures, except profitability, for a five year period, 1989-1993. Profitability figures were provided by RETEX, the Retail Technology Consortium.
Performance means for respondents were computed as follows. Each of the six sets of 80 performance measures (one for each respondent) was sorted from highest to lowest then divided into quartiles. The top twenty respondents on each measure were given a score of 4 points; the bottom twenty received a score of 1 point with members of the intermediate quartiles getting scores of 3 or 2. This procedure allowed us to compute and statistically compare mean performance scores for different categories of firms (e.g., those adopting QR versus those that did not).
Adoption of QR and Existence of Strategic Alignment
Data for testing the hypotheses (1, 1a, 1b) about the links between QR and firm performance were derived from a questionnaire item measuring how frequently respondent companies used each of 12 technologies and applications believed to comprise the QR hierarchy. (See Table 1 .) Respondents were asked to indicate frequency of use on a 5-point scale with 1 anchored at "don't use" and 5 anchored at "mature use." (Intermediate levels were anchored as "investigating," "beginning stages," and "growing use.") Respondents were coded as using QR level 1 if they reported at least "beginning stages" of use of all the technologies or applications associated with QR level 1. The same procedure was used for the other QR levels in the hierarchy.
Data for testing the hypotheses (2 and 2a) about the links between strategic alignment and firm performance were derived from two questionnaire items. The first asked respondents to indicate the percentages of effort (adding up to 100%) their organization devoted to each of three IT strategies (described in Table 2 ). The second asked respondents to allocate effort similarly among three business strategies (retail pipeline orientations-also described in Table 2 ). Firms reporting that they devote 50% or more of their effort to a strategy were coded as using that strategy.
Other Variables
In addition to the two explanations for firm performance addressed in this study (the QR program and strategic alignment), the literature has suggested a number of alternative explanations for (or moderators of) firm performance. The most common include various organizational and technological differences such as: organizational size, firm ownership, product mix, centralization, vertical integration, and IT investment. These factors were measured and assessed in our research design.
Key variables and their measurement and source are presented in Table 6 .
Insert Table 6 about here
Findings
We first discuss the representativeness of the surveyed firms relative to the population of specialty retailers. Then we present the results of the tests of hypotheses.
Respondent Profiles
The firms in the sample had approximately 3000 employees on average. They averaged $345 million in sales, and spent 1.8 % of sales on IT. Average IT investment as a percentage of sales did not differ significantly by firm size. The average firm's implementation of IT began in 1985. (See Table 7 .)
Insert Table 7 about here   Table 8 compares survey respondents with industry averages on key variables including ownership, size, SIC codes, and the performance measures of sales growth, sales per square foot, and stock turns. These variables were selected for comparison because they are relevant to industry analysts and therefore are collected and publicly reported. The respondents generally reflect the specialty retailing industry on all these measures. One-third of respondents are publicly-owned companies, which is close to the mean of 25% reported for the industry (Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, 1993) . The distribution of respondents across 5 basic SIC codes mirrors the industrywide distribution. The sample mean sales growth was over 10%, and comparable store sales growth averaged just under 10%. These figures are similar to the specialty retailing industry averages of 8% sales growth and 7% comparable store sales growth for the same five-year period. Stock turns averaged between 4-7 turns annually, roughly comparable to the industry average of 5-6. But average sales per square foot for respondents was $200-250, well above the industry average of $150-175. These performance measures suggest that the sample is representative of the specialty retailing industry, except on the important measure of sales per square foot, where the sample firms were better performing.
Insert Table 8 about here
Since, by and large, RETEX firms are somewhat more successful than average for their industry, we would expect to see somewhat higher use of QR technologies and somewhat higher strategic match in sample firms than in the industry overall. Nevertheless, we do not believe that these differences seriously limit our ability to generalize the results of our hypothesis tests to the entire specialty retailing industry.
Impact of QR Adoption on Firm Performance
Hypothesis 1 compares the performance of low or non-users of QR with those that make more intensive use of QR technology. Respondents reporting at least beginning stage use of all technologies in QR level 1 were identified as QR adopters. All others were classified as non-adopters. Adopters reporting at least beginning stage use of all technologies in QR level 2 were identified as QR level 2 users and so on. Table 9 shows the number and percentage of respondents adopting QR at level 1 and each subsequent level. It also shows the number and percentage of respondents at each level that had also adopted the technologies of the previous level.
Insert Table 9 about here
The first surprise here is that only 50% of the responding firms were QR adopters at least at level 1. This finding is surprising in light of the advantages claimed for QR in virtually all specialty retailing trade publications. The second surprise is how few firms using the technologies of a particular level also used the technologies of the level below it. The hierarchical description of the QR program leads one to expect that a very high percentage of firms at each level would also report using the technologies of each lower level. But 9 of 17 firms had adopted level 3 without also adopting level 2; 5 of 9 firms had adopted level 4 of the QR program without also adopting level 3. Right away, these findings cast some doubt on the arguments of QR proponents.
But hypothesis testing revealed a somewhat different picture. Recall that Hypothesis 1 compares QR adopters with non-adopters:
H1. Specialty retailers that adopt QR will outperform those that do not adopt QR.
T-tests showed that QR use (of level 1 or higher) was positively associated with all but one measure of firm performance. (See Table 10 .) There were significant positive associations between QR use and profitability, comparable store sales, sales per square foot and stock turns, but not sales per employee. On that measure, non-adopters of QR outperformed adopters. A regression analysis showed that the results were not affected by other factors such as IT investment, industry segment, or firm size. Overall, H1 is strongly supported by our data.
Insert Table 10 about here
An additional analysis was conducted to explore whether the QR program achieved performance improvements in the manner claimed by QR advocates.
H1a. Higher levels of QR adoption will maker greater contributions to performance than lower levels.
The QR program is thought of by practitioners as a hierarchy in which higher levels build on lower levels. However, many of our respondents adopted technologies at a higher level without first having adopted the lower level. We wanted to examine the use of QR levels and classified firms at each level of adoption. The responses were analyzed using a multiple regression analysis with level as a dummy variable, which strengthens the power of the analysis (Cohen, 1978) given the small number of responses in certain cells. (See Table 11 for the regression analysis of performance by QR level.)
Insert Table 11 about here
There is no general trend apparent in these results. Level 1 QR is significant for profitability, comparable store sales growth, and sales per square foot. Level 2 QR was not significantly associated with any performance measures. Level 3 QR had performance impacts on sales per square foot and stock turn. Level 4 QR had significant performance effects on sales per employee and sales per square foot. Levels 3 and 4 involve applications aimed at enhancing efficiencies in the areas of stock, inventory and space management; these applications appear to be having a performance impact. Overall, there were no significant differences among the four levels, providing only mixed results in support of H1a.
H1b. Higher cumulative levels of QR adoption will make greater contributions to performance than lower levels
The previous analysis did not get at the hypothesized cumulative nature of the QR model. To determine whether performance improvement at higher levels of QR requires a base of underlying technologies, we again used regression analysis to compare firms that had cumulatively adopted QR at levels 2, 3 and 4 (see Table 12 ). The performance differences were slight and non-significant. We conclude that Hypothesis 1b is not supported by our data.
Insert Table 12 about here
Taken together, these analyses show strong support for the overall QR hypothesis that adopting QR technology, of level 1 or higher, is associated with increased firm performance compared to non-adoption. However, while we found some support for the existence of a hierarchy of technologies and applications, we found little or no support for the notion of QR advocates that there is a hierarchy of QR usage in which use of higher QR levels is associated with better performance.
Impact of Strategic Alignment on Firm Performance
We now turn to tests of hypotheses derived from the strategic alignment perspective. In our discussion of H1a and H1b we examined only the 40 firms we classified as QR adopters. In this section, all 80 responding firms are examined. We first consider the weaker form of the strategic alignment model, which accepts evidence of fit as support for the hypothesis even if there is no association between fit and performance.
H2a. Specialty retailers will adopt an IT strategy consistent with their corporate (pipeline) strategy (e.g. they will exhibit "match" in the alignment matrix).
Respondents were asked to identify the percentage of effort they focused on each of three business strategies (based on Holland, Lockett and Blackman "pipeline" model) and on each of three IT strategies (based on the Treacy and Wiersema "value disciplines" model). Using the highest reported percentage of effort, each respondent was assigned to a corporate strategy and to an IT strategy. Table 13 shows the distribution of firms across corporate and IT strategy combinations.
Insert Table 13 about here
Two types of matches were observed: firms with both an internal business strategy focus and a transaction efficiency focus in their IT, and firms with both a customer strategy focus and a customer detail IT focus. No firms in our sample reported a major emphasis on the supplier-focused business strategy or a supplier partnering IT strategy. The lack of Supplier Focus and Supplier Partnering IT may reflect that this industry has not yet recognized the supplier as a key strategic partner. The preponderance of firms focusing internally suggests a strong industry bias.
Seventy-nine percent of respondents fell into two matching cells of the Strategic Alignment Matrix. This can be interpreted as strong support for Hypothesis 2a, the weaker form of the strategic alignment hypothesis. We turn now to the stronger form of the hypothesis: Table 14 shows the mean performance values for firms in matching cells versus the firms in the non-matching cells of Table 13 . Hypothesis 2, the strong form of the strategic alignment hypothesis was not supported by our data. Matched and non-matched firms differed little in profitability, comparable store sales growth, sales per square foot and stock turns. The only statistically significant difference was in sales per employee, but this difference was in the direction opposite to that hypothesized: non-matching firms actually performed better than matching firms on this dimension. A regression analysis showed that the results were not affected by other factors such as IT investment, industry segment, or firm size.
H2. Specialty retailers with a match between their corporate (pipeline) strategy and their IT strategy will outperform those with a mismatch.
Insert Table 14 about here
In short, we found only weak support for the strategic alignment hypothesis. While firms did appear to seek a match between their business strategy and their IT strategy, strategic alignment was not associated with higher firm performance.
This result could mean that other factors intervened to diminish the performance effects of match. But regression analyses using organization size (measured as a fiveyear average of annual sales), IT investment (measured as a five-year average of IT spending as a percentage of sales), and SIC code ruled out this explanation. Alternatively, our results could mean that firms in the specialty retailing industry do not seek strategic alignment; instead they may simply appear to seek alignment because most of them are pursuing an internal business focus with information technologies designed to increase transaction efficiency. (This interpretation is not likely to gladden the hearts of the business strategists!)
We next performed a "strength of alignment" comparison with the same results (see Table 15 ). This analysis evaluated the differences between the percentages of effort spent on corporate versus IT strategies. The total differences were then used to identify the strength of the alignment between business and IT strategies; those firms with little difference between the effort on aligned business and IT strategies were stronger in alignment. For example, a firm spending 60% effort on Internal Focus business and 60% effort on Transaction Efficiency IT were considered very strongly aligned. The results split firms on strength of alignment into quartiles. Top and bottom quartiles were compared (see Table 15 ); strongly aligned firms did not outperform less strongly aligned firms on any of the performance measures. The only statistically significant difference was in sales per employee in the direction opposite to that hypothesized.
Insert Table 15 about here
Summary of Fin dings
The results of our analyses are summarized in Table 16 . The results show that QR adoption (at level 1 or higher) is the best predictor of most performance measures. Strategic alignment was prevalent across the sample, with nearly 80% of the firms in alignment (with a strong bias toward internal strategic focus and transaction efficient IT), but strategic alignment was not significantly associated with organizational performance.
Insert Table 16 about here
Discussion
The findings reported above create a surprising pattern. First, our results provide some support and some disconfirming evidence for both the QR perspective and the strategic alignment perspective. There was an association between adoption of the QR program at level 1 or higher and several measures of performance, and an apparent match between IT and business strategy. But there was no association between strategic alignment and performance and no support for the notion of a QR hierarchy.
One possible explanation of the association of QR adoption with higher performance is that higher performing firms are better able to afford QR technologies. Case studies of eight of the firms in this study suggest, however, that cost factors and availability of slack resources were not the primary cons iderations in adopting or not adopting QR.
"Three high performing firms found that QR was important to supporting key operations. The other high performing firm did not adopt QR, because they saw other competitive advantages available to the firm, the technologies were too difficult, and there were not provable economic incentives for suppliers. Two low performing firms had problems in adopting QR while two others chose not to develop QR because of their supplier relationships. Adoption of QR is influenced by several factors, including level of current IT sophistication and supplier relationships." (Palmer, 1995) .
We believe, therefore, that the theoretically derived hypothesis that QR adoption leads to higher performance is still tenable.
The lack of association between strategic alignment and performance is not inconsistent with the work of Papp and Luftman (1995) , who failed to identify any performance effect of alignment. The findings do differ from Papp and Luftman (1995) and Luftman (1997) , however, in that they found few firms in alignment and we found many. Thus, our study represents more convincing evidence against strategic alignment theory than do prior studies.
Despite the overall strong association between QR and performance, the QR model did not emerge from our analysis totally unscathed. Some companies adopted higher levels of QR without adopting lower levels, despite consultants' recommendations. Further, adopting higher QR levels did not appear to lead to improved performance effects. These results suggest the need to redefine the QR program and the QR hierarchy. There are clear technology investments in levels 1 and 2 and more application specific investment in levels 3 and 4. Perhaps this suggests a simpler model of a technology level and an application level.
Finally, only half of the responding firms had adopted QR at any level. Is this because they did not believe that QR has performance impacts, or because they believed the technologies of QR are inconsistent with their strategies? If so, this explanation is especially hard to reconcile with the fact that most of our respondents pursued an internally focused strategy and that QR is generally viewed as more supportive of such a strategy than either a customer-or a supplier-oriented focus. In short, the QR model clearly needs further work.
The findings of our study are consistent with earlier work showing that company investments in transaction oriented IT, but not "strategic systems," improve organizational performance (Weill, 1992) . Our findings do not support Wiersema's (1993, 1995) arguments about the importance of company focus on a single "value discipline." One possible explanation for our surprising results may lie in the limitations of this particular study. The study involved the specialty retailing industry; this segment may differ from general retailing and other industries in its already high degree of strategic differentiation based on product line. Further, since our respondents were members of a techno logy-oriented consortium, they may differ in their greater use of IT (or in their greater current need for IT due to late adoption). Thus, some questions about our findings will only be settled when the study has been replicated in other industries.
Other possible explanations for our results include an industry tendency to focus on the internal perspective and concentrate on cost reduction. Alternatively, the IT specialist respondents may have underreported supplier and customer focuses. Another answer may be that, given the industry situation, firms adopting QR were actually in alignment and those that had not were misaligned. While the measurement of strategic alignment is not entirely precise, the understanding of the terms generated through the pilot use of the instrument and the use of similar respondents across the companies tend to validate the accuracy of the responses.
Although we cannot generalize our findings beyond the specialty retailing segment of the retail industry, the pattern of our findings is sufficiently surprising to raise questions about the received theory of strategic alignment. We think these questions need to be taken seriously. So, let's for the moment assume that future research corroborates the findings of our research. What could these findings mean?
If replicated, the findings of our study would suggest that, while the QR program is defined differently from firm to firm, those who adopt some version of the QR can expect performance benefits. Today, the specialty retailing industry is still new enough to the technology that most adopters appear to benefit. The concentration of the QR program is on transaction efficiency and cost reduction, areas where there may still be room for substantial improvement in the retailing industry. Whether these benefits would continue after most firms in the industry segment have adopted QR is unknown.
The limited adoption of QR technologies and applications may also provide some insights. Few companies use the entire range of QR technologies and applications. Firms' concentration on different elements of the retail pipeline may drive firms' choices of what parts of the QR program to adopt or not to adopt. Non-technological issues involved in sharing information with suppliers regarding inventory and sales have often kept suppliers from truly managing inventories and participating fully in the concepts of space management and seasonless retailing. It may also be the case that the larger the number of suppliers, the more difficult it becomes for a firm to develop an economic justification for QR (Bouchard, 1992) . Finally, many retailing firms appear to wait until technologies are ubiquitous and commoditized before they purchase and adopt them. POS is a good example of one of the few technologies that has reached this level. EDI, satellite, and advanced QR applications may not have reached the level of stability required for most specialty retailers to adopt them.
If the findings of our study are replicated, they might mean that strategic alignment has become institutionalized. Firms may have accepted and internalized academic exhortations to align their business and IT strategies. If so, alignment per se ceases to be a differentiating factor in firm performance. An alternative explana tion is that what appears to be alignment is actually a case of strong industry bias toward internal strategic focus and transaction efficiency in the use of IT. If so, these findings are vexing for strategists who argue that healthy industry segments require firms that individually pursue differentiated business strategies while collectively pursuing a complete range of strategies. In other words, our findings may be ammunition for strategists like Cooper (1995) , who argue that firms compete on multiple dimensions simultaneously, and against strategists like Miles and Snow (1986) and Treacy and Wiersema (1995) , who argue that companies can and should attempt to define differentiated strategic playing fields. Put differently, a plausible explanation for our findings is that specialty retailing has been moving toward the lean enterprise model (Cooper, 1995) . As collisions with competitors increase, those who update their operations with QR gain, and those who do not fall behind, regardless of alignment.
Conclusion
This research set out to assess the effects of information technology on firm performance in the specialty retailing industry and to triangulate a theoretical model with practical advice about the QR program. Our findings provide surprisingly little support for either. Clearly our study requires replication within the general retailing context and in other labor-intensive industries. Another avenue of future research is the supplierretailer relationship and its impact on QR adoption and supplier and retailer performance. Future work on QR should include monitoring the adoption of technologies over time.
The implications of our study for practice are more challenging. Our study supports a recommendation to implement at least some elements of the QR program. Conversely, we find no basis for the advice we would like to give: We cannot say that firms must tailor their QR investments to unique firm strategies. We hope that our uncomfortable findings will challenge both academicians and practitioners to refine their models of what makes IT investments worthwhile. Automated point-of-sale applications supported with bar coding and universal product code (UPC) labeling. In-store customer service including automatic price look-up Distribution and inventory management through electronic data interchange (EDI) for merchandise order entry 2 Automatic inventory replenishment using point-of-sale information for inventory pull Sales and inventory forecasting Inventory management and order processing through electronic invoicing, EDI for order status, invoicing and advance shipment notices 3
Pre-and post-season planning using the information gleaned through the elements of the earlier stages Improved distribution processing through automatic shipment container marking and arrangement enabling cross-docking of transportation fleet 4
Suppliers take over inventory management functions, accepting responsibility for yield and , space management Seasonless retailing, the ability to provide all products on a yearround basis
Adapted from: Retail Information Systems News, "Uncovering the Keys to Quick Response," Special Supplement, January 1993. Holland, Lockett and Blackman (1992) 
Correspondi ng IT Strategy
Referring to use of IT derived from Treacy and Wiersema (1993) 
